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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to investigate the yet-to-develop assurance market, its links with the
mature auditing market, and the role that the Big4 auditing ﬁrms (KPMG, EY, PwC, and Deloitte)
play in the former. We use data submitted to the Global Reporting Initiative by companies in 18
countries, for the years 2011–2013, in order to obtain a global overview that allows generalization
of the results. We ﬁnd higher levels of disclosure and increased credibility of sustainability
reports (SRs) when the ﬁnancial auditor is a Big4. Companies audited by a Big4 are more likely
to assure the SR than those audited by a non-Big4. Our paper conﬁrms the connection between
ﬁnancial auditor and assurer of SR provider in an international setting: the choice of a Big4 as a
ﬁnancial auditor is a driver for the choice of a Big4 as an assurer provider, suggesting a potential
competitive advantage. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
Received 31 March 2017; revised 6 July 2017; accepted 13 July 2017
Keywords: assurance; sustainability report; assurer specialization; ﬁnancial auditor in CSR; Big4; quality of sustainability report; credibility
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Introduction

T

HE WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IS EVOLVING TO A MORE SOLID STAGE WHERE CREDIBILITY IS AN

important issue (KPMG, 2008, 2011, 2013). Accountability might be the trigger in this direction. The
assurance of a sustainability report (SR) acts as an independent control system where an assurer expresses
an opinion with the purpose of providing credibility to the sustainability information disclosed by ﬁrms. The
Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE, 2006) highlights the importance of applying a criterion to
verify the SRs, in order to enhance the degree of conﬁdence of the users of SRs.
The SR assurance process is inspired by the ﬁnancial audit (Deegan et al., 2006a; Boiral and Gendron, 2011;
Heras-Saizarbitoria et al., 2013). Both ﬁnancial audit and assurance of an SR have the same scope: reducing the
information risk (Cohen and Simnett, 2015). However, there are signiﬁcant differences. Contrary to ﬁnancial
auditing, assurance statements (ASs) for SRs are voluntary; hence, managers decide if they want to inform their
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stakeholders about their environmental, social, and economic performance, and if they want to enrich their reports
by hiring an independent reviewer. In addition, although assurance is expected to measure a subject matter against
criteria (IAASB, 2010), there is no generally accepted standard for this assurance process.
In recent years, accounting ﬁrms, and among them especially the Big4 (KPMG, EY, PwC, and Deloitte) have
increased their participation in the SR assurance market. It seems that these big audit ﬁrms prize the SR assurance
market as an opportunity. However, they also face several challenges such as litigation risk (Ballou et al., 2006) or
reputation risk, which might, in the end, affect their ﬁnancial audit service. Currently, the largest accounting ﬁrms
(Big4) control the SR assurance market (Suddaby et al., 2007; KPMG, 2013).
An initial approach to the relationship between the ﬁnancial auditor and the sustainability assurer was made by
Sierra-García et al. (2013). They analyzed a sample of Spanish ﬁrms and found a signiﬁcant association between the
ﬁnancial auditor and the SR assurer. These authors asserted that the choice of a Big4 as an SR assurance provider
depends on the industry of the reporting entity. They also opened a new avenue for future research regarding the
strategies of the Big4 in sustainability assurance. Zorio et al. (2013) worked with a sample of Spanish listed
companies for the period 2005–2010, and found associations between CSR reporting, its assurance, and the
ﬁnancial auditor. Cohen and Simnett (2015) identiﬁed a research gap in the market of sustainability assurance,
speciﬁcally the inﬂuence of the market characteristics on the choice of the assurance provider. We address this
gap by looking at the role of Big4 audit ﬁrms (ﬁrms that control the auditing market) at the level of sustainability
disclosure, as well as their participation on the assurance market. Given that previous studies on the topic include
only Spanish companies, and that reporting practices vary across countries due to different cultural and social
norms or governmental regulations (Golob and Bartlett, 2007; Sotorrío and Sánchez, 2010; Hahn and Kühnen,
2013), our paper investigates the role Big4 auditing ﬁrms play in CSR reporting and its assurance. We aim to
generalize the relationship between auditors and assurers to an international setting.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction, we discuss the current state of SR assurance, and
its theoretical background, including the development of the hypotheses. We then explain the sample and the
methodology. The ﬁnal sections are devoted to discussing the results and presenting the main conclusions from
the study.

Background and Hypotheses Development
CSR reporting is a mechanism used by companies to disclose information about their environmental, economic,
and social activities as well as the impact these activities have on a wide range of stakeholders. The need for
transparency toward stakeholders (Van Riel, 2000; Kaptein and van Tulder, 2003; Dubbink et al., 2008) is an
important driver leading to better-quality SRs. The willingness of companies to voluntarily communicate CSR topics
may be explained by legitimacy theory. Legitimacy theory supports the existence of a ‘social contract’ between a
company and society, by which the company behaves in such a way that society recognizes it as socially responsible
(O’Donovan, 2002). The disclosure of CSR information through SRs legitimizes the role of the ﬁrm within the
society (Deegan, 2002; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006) given that when society perceives that a company’s behavior
is not adequate, corporate reputation is affected (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). Furthermore, organizations include
norms from their environment to gain legitimacy, which produce differences in disclosure due to the location of the
company (Chizema and Buck, 2006) or industry (Fonseca, 2010).
Regarding ﬁnancial reporting, prior research in ﬁnancial auditing found that companies audited by a Big4 report
higher levels of disclosure, and companies audited by a Big4 provide more information via the Internet (Bonsón and
Escobar, 2006; Andrikopoulos and Diakidis, 2007). Furthermore, auditing-ﬁrms inﬂuence their clients to increase
their levels of disclose in order to send signals to the market (Aripin et al., 2010; Joshi and Said, 2012). This
signaling might not be different for sustainability disclosure. Sustainability is a new topic with high pressure from
stakeholders. For example, Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014a) found that pressure from different stakeholders such as
consumers, investors, employees, or the environment of a company, positively affects the quality of the information
disclosed. Odriozola and Baraibar-Diez (2017) found that the quality of the reports improves the company
reputation. Consumer perception of companies has also been extensively studied in marketing because it affects
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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consumer behavior when deciding to purchase goods or services (Mohr et al., 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001;
Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004; Klein and Dawar, 2004; Becker-Olsen et al., 2006; Sen et al., 2006). Regarding
investors, a Chartered Financial Analysts Institute’s survey conducted in 2015 found that 73% of institutional investors take sustainability into account when making investment decisions (Beller, 2016). Besides, the audit market is a
highly concentrated market in which competitiveness is questionable (Singh, 2013; Whittle et al., 2014).
Previous studies in sustainability reporting link the higher level of disclosure on sustainability to companies in
industries that need to legitimize their activities due to their environmental impact. For example, companies in
industries such as Energy and Chemical, present a higher level of sustainability disclosures than their
counterparts in other industries (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Campbell, 2003; Alali and Romero, 2012). Financial
services companies also have a high level of disclosure, but they are not perceived as having a negative impact on
the environment. However, given that they do not need to take measures such as emissions or water consumption,
and their responsibility is limited to social and economic impacts, they are able to increase consumer satisfaction
with little additional reporting costs. Disclosure has also been related to public companies. Unlike privately owned
companies, public ﬁrms depend on external ﬁnancial resources from capital markets. Hence, they need to increase
their visibility and avoid risks (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Branco and Rodrigues,
2008; Simnett et al., 2009; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014a). These studies indicate that regulated industries and
those that are subject to greater pressure from their stakeholders tend to disclose more information on sustainability
than their counterparts in other industries. Besides that, the Big4 are leaders in ﬁnancial auditing among regulated
and social/environmental sensitive industries (De Beelde, 1997; Abidin et al., 2010).
Our study looks at the relationship between the choice of a Big4 as a ﬁnancial auditor and the level of disclosure
on sustainability. Based on the higher level of disclosure prompted by the Big4, their industry specialization, as well
as stakeholder pressure, there might be incentives for these accounting ﬁrms to inﬂuence their clients to report
more on sustainability. Given that the probability of hiring a Big4 as a ﬁnancial auditor is higher in companies
belonging to regulated industries and those that are subject to greater pressure from their stakeholders, we expect
that companies audited by a Big4 will present higher levels of disclosure on sustainability as well. Based on this
connection, our ﬁrst hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1. Companies report on sustainability with higher levels of disclosure when their ﬁnancial auditor is a Big4.
SR assurance is quite a new academic and professional ﬁeld (Smith et al., 2011). Although it is difﬁcult to assess
the quality of the reports (Hahn and Kühnen, 2013), it is enhanced by the issuance of an independent AS (Laufer,
2003). According to legitimacy theory, organizations adopt norms required by their environment to guarantee their
survival. Tate et al. (2010) found that institutional pressure is the major driving force behind strategy development
in terms of SR. From that perspective, the SR assurance might reduce stakeholder pressure and facilitate survival
because it increases the quality of the reports (Ballou et al., 2006).
There are different reasons for companies to assure their SRs. Among them, Park and Brorson (2005) identiﬁed
the need to enhance credibility, the necessity to improve the internal reporting system, the need of comparability
with other issuers, and the visibility of environmental attitudes. Besides, they identiﬁed the following reasons for
not hiring assurance: cost, lack of value added to the report, other priorities, and the lack of external pressure toward
assurance. There are also theoretical contradictory arguments about the usefulness of an AS for companies. One of
the approaches, the substantive, supports a genuine interest in transparency, while the second, symbolic, describes
an interest in creating a positive portray of the company (Rodrigue et al., 2013; Michelon et al., 2015). Assurance in
this approach becomes window dressing.
Independently of the company purpose, SR assurance evolved in time, both in business and as a matter of study
in academia (Cohen and Simnett, 2015). An interesting fact in the evolution of SR assurance is the entry of the big
auditing ﬁrms into the assurance market during the last decade. Mock et al. (2013) analyzed the evolution of
assurance with a 2006–2007 sample comparing it to a 2002–2004 sample previously analyzed by Mock et al.
(2007). They reported that the percentage of SRs assured by the Big4 increased from 35.4% to 51.35% between
the two periods.
The choice of assurance provider has been studied as a determinant of the quality of the AS and the SR. Simnett
et al. (2009) measured the quality of the AS based on the type of assurer. They assigned a higher ranking if an
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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auditor issued the AS. Perego (2009) found that the Big4 provide a report of higher quality in terms of format and
procedure and lower quality in terms of recommendations and opinion. Also, Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2012) found
evidence that auditors issue a higher-quality AS (measured by compliance with regulations) than consultants. Using
an international sample of 1233 ﬁrm-year observations for the period 2007–2014, Martínez-Ferrero and GarcíaSánchez (2016) found that ASs of SRs assured by a specialized Big4, reported more material errors than other assurers. The authors explained their results based on the Big4’s greater experience in auditing, better training, and
more knowledge as industry experts. However, Hodge et al. (2009) did not ﬁnd evidence indicating that auditors
have more credibility than consultants. Hodge et al. (2009) and Pﬂugrath et al. (2011) concluded that when the
SR was assured by accountants, its perceived credibility increased. Gürtürk and Hahn (2015) discussed differences
among providers and identiﬁed an isomorphic process in Big4 assurors. Previous research also found that accountants adopt a more cautious approach to SR assurance than consultants, looking at consistency, and avoiding terms
like ‘true and fair’ (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005).
Big4 ﬁnancial auditors may inﬂuence their auditees to report on sustainability and assure the SRs, because it is a
means to improving the overall quality of the company’s reporting, and enhancing its credibility. The SR is not part
of the ﬁnancial reports but part of a ﬁrm’s reporting strategy. Our research explored whether the ﬁnancial auditor
inﬂuences the sustainability reporting strategy regarding SR assurance of the SR among their clients. Thus, our
second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2. Companies report on sustainability with higher levels of credibility when the ﬁnancial auditor is a Big4.
Working on samples of large companies (largest 100 in each of more than 20 countries), KPMG (2013, 2015)
shows an increase in the SRs externally assured from 27% in 2002 to 42% in 2015. KPMG also highlights that
the market share of the Big4 increases from 60% of the assured SRs in 2005 (KPMG, 2008: 63) to 67% of the
assured SRs in 2013 (KPMG, 2013). There is not a unique reason to explain the motivation to increase this
participation: the suitability of the profession (Sierra et al., 2013), among them, the opening of a new market, or
the willingness to offer a broader service to their clients, may be subjacent factors.
From the stakeholders’ point of view, Dando and Swift (2003) conclude that the AS can improve the level of conﬁdence of the information disclosed, but that the assurance market was in its initial stages at that time, and its transparency was not sufﬁcient to demonstrate corporate commitment. Although the actual addressees of the SR and its
corresponding AS should be the stakeholders, previous research reports a different situation. Hasan et al. (2003)
drew attention to the managers’ control of the AS process, given that the addressees of the AS analyzed were the
managers. Similar results were reported by Ball et al. (2000), O’Dwyer (2003), O’Dwyer and Owen (2005, 2007),
Smith et al. (2011), and Manurung and Basuki (2010). These results indicate that the AS is an internal report issued
to satisfy managers instead of an instrument to guarantee transparency to stakeholders.
In terms of issuers of the AS, i.e., the AS suppliers, criticisms are mostly linked to the role played by the
assurance provider: the non-existence of clear guidelines (Hasan et al., 2005); ambiguity in the AS (Deegan et al.,
2006a, 2006b); and the lack of care in the veriﬁcation (Gillet, 2012). A second and important issue, linked to the
suppliers of ASs, is their lack of independence. O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) stated that given that consultants are
hired to give advice to managers, they might not be independent if acting as AS providers simultaneously. Sierra
et al. (2013) found frequent coincidence between the auditor and the assurance provider. The authors highlighted
the possible conﬂict of interest produced by providing both services simultaneously. Ball et al. (2000) and Deegan
et al. (2006b) questioned the value-added by the assurance process given the poor levels of independence and the
lack of standards. O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) also found that consultants are more likely than auditors to include
a statement of independence from the client. Other authors highlight the positive synergies that may occur if the
ﬁnancial auditor is also the SR assuror because of their ability to leverage the relevance of corporate responsibility
within the organization (Viehöver et al., 2010).
Prior literature offers little background to evaluate the role played by ﬁnancial auditors in the sustainability
assurance service. It has analyzed auditors and assurance providers independently of each other. As the assurance market develops, more and more big accounting ﬁrms are joining it. This discussion leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Companies audited by a Big4 are more likely to hire a Big4 to assure their sustainability reports.
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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Sample and Research Methods
Data Collection and Sample Description
We collected data submitted to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) database for the years 2011 to 2013. We selected
this period because of data availability. The GRI provides the main framework of principles and guidelines for
disclosing sustainability information (Brown et al., 2009; Kaye, 2011; KPMG, 2013) with the aim of boosting the
quality and transparency of SRs. Speciﬁcally, the GRI proposes contents and key indicators to be disclosed in the
SR, and recommends the external assurance of this report. From the ﬁrst version in 1999 until now, the GRI
guidelines have been updated to adapt reporting to new requirements and to different kinds of companies. To
complete our sample, we removed duplicates and hand-collected the name of the ﬁnancial auditor from different
sources: the companies’ websites, public databases, and even by contacting the ﬁrms. We selected a mixture of 18
countries, considering the availability of data in the GRI database and the accessibility of other primary data sources,
in order to obtain a global overview that allows generalization of the results. Among the selected countries, we
collected data from the USA because of the economic importance of the assurance market. We also selected
Spain because the large companies in this country lead the world in quality of CSR reports (KPMG, 2013). The
remaining sample was selected from developing (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico) and developed (e.g.
UK, Germany, Canada, and Australia) countries; also from countries considered environmentally conscious (e.g.
Sweden and Finland).
We worked with two samples to test our three hypotheses. Sample 1 includes all SRs of the companies in the
selected countries registered in the GRI database during the period 2011–2013 from which the ﬁnancial auditor
is known. It is used to test H1 and H2. It includes 2751 company-year observations. Table 1 presents the total number and percentage of companies from each country.
Sample 2 includes the reports in Sample 1 that have an external AS. It is used to test H3. It contains 1415
company-year observations (Table 1). Of sample 2, 93.9% have their ﬁnancial statements audited by a Big4 and
66.1% of the sample have Big4 auditors as SR assurors.

Sample 1 H1 & H2
Country
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Mexico
Netherlands
Portugal
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States of America
Total

Sample 2 H3

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

81
159
198
108
60
50
52
216
68
133
100
149
70
165
263
268
149
462
2751

2.9
5.8
7.2
3.9
2.2
1.8
1.9
7.9
2.5
4.8
3.6
5.4
2.5
6.0
9.6
9.7
5.4
16.8
100

22
102
87
37
28
35
37
104
38
96
52
95
45
90
190
165
77
115
1415

1.6
7.2
6.1
2.6
2.0
2.5
2.6
7.3
2.7
6.8
3.7
6.7
3.2
6.4
13.4
11.7
5.4
8.1
100

Table 1. Sample distribution by country
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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Methodology
Three analytical models were deﬁned to address the three hypotheses previously raised:
Disclosure = f1 (FABig4, control variables): Model 1
Credibility = f2 (FABig4, control variables): Model 2
AssurerBig4 = f3 (FABig4, control variables): Model 3
Given that we have repeated measures for each company during the period 2011–2013 and the possible existence
of nested data by country, we tested the convenience of using a generalized linear mixed model as a statistical approach. For that purpose, we ran a regression without explanatory variables with country as random effect. As a second step, we introduced in the model explanatory variables both at country and at company level.
The model can be expressed as follows.

Pr Y ij ¼ 1
 ¼ βoj þ β1j X1ij þ … þ βnj Xnij þ εij
log
Pr Y ij ¼ 0
Yij is the response variable in each model. The double index refers to the ith company in the jth country
X1ij, …, Xnij represent the n explanatory variables at the company level
εij represents the error or random variation around the average
The parameters βoj, β1j, … βnj are variables with values that may vary from one country to another. For example, β0j
includes three components:
• A ﬁxed component (γ00) that represents the global average of the dependent variable.
• A second component representing the explanatory variables at the country level (Z1j, , Zmj).
• A random component (U0j, …, Unj) that represents the variability of the means of the dependent variables in the
different countries with respect to the global variability.
β0j¼ γ00þ γ01 Z1j þ … þ γ0m Zmj þ U 0j
β1j¼ γ10 þ γ11 Z1j þ … þ γ1m Zmj þ U 1j
βnj¼ γn0 þ γn1 Z1j þ … þ γnm Zmj þ U nj

The model establishes a hierarchy in the data. In our sample, company-year (level 1) is nested in countries (level
2); hence, data at the company-year level are not independent within each country given their common country
characteristics.

Variable Description
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables of each of our three models are: Disclosure, Credibility, and AssurerBig4 (Assurance provider
being a Big4). Table 2 summarizes the dependent, explanatory and control variables included in each of the three
models.
Disclosure represents the level of sustainability information reported by each company. It cannot be measured
directly, because it depends on different factors. Level of application has previously been used as a proxy for
Disclosure (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014b) and completeness, relevance/evolution, and public disclosure, linked
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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Model 1

Dependent variables
Disclosure
Credibility
AssurerBig4
Explanatory variable
FABig4
Control variables
Country
Legal system
EU
Year
Environmental pressure
Consumer pressure
Employee pressure
Investor pressure
Disclosure
Industry
Size
Listed

215
Model 2

Model 3

x
x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Table 2. Variable deﬁnition

to transparency (Dubbink et al., 2008). According to Eccles et al. (2012), a high level of application means more
communication of global activities, which is linked to SR transparency. In this study, we measured disclosure with
the level of application of GRI. The variable adopts two values: 1, when company reports with the highest level of
disclosure (level A in G3 guidance and ‘In accordance-comprehensive’, in G4) and 0, otherwise. It is the dependent
variable in Model 1.
Credibility refers to the existence of an assurance statement. It represents the answer to the demands from
stakeholders and reinforces reliability of the companies (Kaptein and van Tulder, 2003; Dubbink et al., 2008;
Grushina, 2011). This variable adopts a value of 1 if the SR is assured and 0 if it is not. It is the dependent variable
in Model 2.
AssurerBig4 adopts a value of 1 if the assurance provider of the SR is a Big4, and 0 otherwise. It is the dependent
variable in Model 3.
Explanatory and Control Variables
Given that our hypotheses focus on the relationship between the ﬁnancial auditor being a Big4 and the dependent
variables, our single explanatory variable is FABig4. FABig4 is a dichotomous variable that adopts a value of 1 if the
ﬁnancial auditor is a Big4 and 0 otherwise. This variable is used in the three models.
To control for the effect other variables may have on the variability of the dependent variable, we included several
control variables that may differ for each of the models (Table 2).

Control Variables in Models 1, 2, and 3
Country. Reporting practices vary across countries due to different cultural and social norms or governmental
regulations (Golob and Bartlett, 2007; Sotorrío and Sánchez, 2010; Hahn and Kühnen, 2013). This variable was
used as a random effect in the three models. It adopted 18 values.
To further analyze the country effect on the response variable, we introduced the following control variables at the
country level:
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
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Legalsystem. Following La Porta et al. (1997) we classiﬁed countries in four groups: English (Canada, Australia,
South Africa, UK, and USA) coded as 1; French (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, France, Greece, Italy, Mexico,
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) coded as 2; German origin (Germany) coded as 3; and Scandinavian
(Finland and Sweden) coded as 4. It was included in all the models.
EU: This variable adopts a value of 1 if the company is in the EU and 0 otherwise. It controls for the effect of
EU policies toward sustainability that make Europe a leader in sustainability reporting and assurance (Romero
et al., 2014; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014b). It is used in the three ﬁrst models.

Year is part of the structure of the model due to the repeated measures for each company.

Other control variables in Models 1 and 2
Stakeholder pressure captures differences in CSR reporting and assurance due to different stakeholder pressure in
each sector (Morhardt, 2010; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014a). It is used in Models 1 and 2, and it is developed following Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014a). The authors identify four industry sets:
Environment-press. Companies from industries with high environmental impacts may need to engage in sustainability reporting in order to respond to sector-speciﬁc stakeholder pressure (Parsa and Kouhy, 2008;
Sotorrío and Sánchez, 2010; Hahn and Kühnen, 2013; Cho et al., 2014). It adopts a value of 1 if the company
is in the following industries: Agriculture, Automotive, Aviation, Chemical, Construction, Construction
materials, Energy, Energy utilities, Forest and paper products, Logistics, Metal products, Mining, Railroad,
Waste management, and Water utilities. All other companies are labeled as 0.
Employee-press. This variable indicates differences in CSR reporting due to employee pressure. Following
Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014a), it is measured with size. Company size, is linked to the level of pressure from
stakeholders (Agudo et al., 2012). Large companies are highly controlled, and are more likely to disclose higher
levels of CSR information to manage the risk of their great visibility (Chen and Bouvain, 2009; Simnett et al.,
2009). This variable is consistently found to have a positive effect on sustainability reporting (Hahn and
Kühnen, 2013). It adopts a value of 1 if the company is large (headcount is 250 or more; turnover is more than
50 million € or balance sheet total is more than 43 million €) and 0 otherwise.
Investor-press. This variable indicates differences in CSR reporting due to investor pressure. Following
Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014a), it adopts a value of 1 if the company is listed, 0 otherwise.
Consumer-press. This variable indicates differences in reporting due to consumer pressure. Following
Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014a), it adopts a value of 1 if the company is in an industry well known to the general
public as a consumer of its products or services. It includes Energy utilities; Financial services; Food and
beverage products; Healthcare, household, and personal products; Retailers; Telecommunications; Textiles
and apparel; Waste management; and Water utilities. These industries were proposed by Sweeney and
Coughlan (2008) and Branco and Rodrigues (2008). We include in this classiﬁcation other industries meeting
the same criteria: Commercial services, Consumer durables, Media, Tobacco, Tourism/leisure, Toys, and
Universities as well. For all the other industries, the variable adopts a value of 0.
Disclosure, the dependent variable in Model 1 is also used as control variable in models 2 and 3.

Other control variables in Model 3
Industry captures the industry specialization of the Big4. It is deﬁned following Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014b). It
adopts a value of 1, if the company belongs to Energy (Chemical, Energy, and Energy utilities); 2, if Construction
(Construction, Construction materials); 3, if Commercial goods and services (Commercial services, Healthcare
services, Media, Non-proﬁt services, Public agency, Real estate, Tourism, Universities, Waste management, Water
utilities); 4, if Transportation (Aviation, Logistic, Railroad); 5, if Primary sector (Agriculture, Forest and paper
products, Mining); 6, if Manufacturing (Automotive, Equipment, Metal products); 7, if Technology (Computers,
Technology hardware, Telecommunications); 8, if Consumer goods (Consumer durables, Food and beverages,
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Health care products, Household and personal products, Retailers); 9, if Others (Conglomerates, Others); and 10, if
Financial services. It is included in Model 3.
Size adopts a value of 1 if the company is large (headcount is 250 or more; turnover is more than €50 million or
Balance Sheet total is more than €43 million) and 0 otherwise. This variable is included in Model 3.
Listed adopts a value of 1 if the company is listed, 0 otherwise. It is included in Model 3.

Results
H1: Companies report on sustainability with higher levels of disclosure when the ﬁnancial auditor is a Big4
Using the data in Sample 1, we ran the unconditional model 1, including exclusively country as explanatory
variable (country as random effect). The Z-Wald test conﬁrmed the signiﬁcance of this variable at 99% (p-value is
0.006). We then analyzed the covariance parameters, and we calculated the intraclass correlation coefﬁcient. This
coefﬁcient indicates the explanatory capacity of the country variable. Country-level determinants explain 47.36%
of the total variability of the dependent variable (Disclosure), justifying nesting data in two levels and using
generalized linear mixed models.
When we introduced in the model the explanatory and control variables FABig4, EU, Legalsystem, and the four
variables referring to stakeholder pressure, the intraclass correlation coefﬁcient was 43.59%. This result indicates a
slight reduction respect to the corresponding parameter in the unconditional model (47.36%), which implies that
there is an explanatory effect of all or part of the variables introduced in the model.
The last column in Table 3 shows the exponential coefﬁcients of the ﬁxed effects, indicating the odds of presenting the highest level of disclosure as opposed to the lowest. All other things being equal, the odds are:
• 0.412 times lower in companies audited by a non-Big4 than in companies audited by a Big4. Companies with Big4
ﬁnancial auditors report on sustainability with higher levels of disclosure.
• 7.191 times higher in companies in the French legal system than in countries in the Scandinavian legal system.
Companies in countries with the French legal system are more likely to report with the highest level of disclosure
than companies in Scandinavia.
• 0.372 times lower in non-European countries than in European countries. Companies in the EU disclose with
higher levels than their counterparts in other countries.
• 0.485 times lower in companies without environmental pressure than in companies with it.

Model term

Coeff.

Std. error

t

Sig.

Intercept
FABig4 (noBig4)
LegalSystem (English)
LegalSystem (French)
LegalSystem (German)
LegalSystem (Scandinavian)
EU (non-EU)
Environmentpress. (no-environment press.)
Employee-press. (no-employee-press.)
Consumer-press. (no-consumer-press.)
Investor-press. (no-investor-press)

-1.202
-0.886
1.504
1.973
1.700
0.000
-0.989
-0.724
-0.750
-0.058
-0.439

Exp (coeff.)

0.650
0.198
0.852
0.729
1.084

-1.851
-4.469
1.765
2.706
1.568

0.064*
0.000***
0.078*
0.007***
0.117

0.300
0.412
4.498
7.191
5.473

0.499
0.100
0.223
0.100
0.112

-1.983
-7.231
-3.361
-0.581
-3.930

0.047**
0.000***
0.001***
0.561
0.000***

0.372
0.485
0.472
0.943
0.645

Table 3. Fixed coefﬁcients (Model 1)
*signiﬁcant at 90% level
**signiﬁcant at 95% level
***signiﬁcant at 99% level
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• 0.472 times lower in companies with no employee pressure than in companies with employee pressure.
• 0.645 times lower in companies without investor pressure than in companies with it.
In summary, companies report on sustainability with higher levels of disclosure when the ﬁnancial auditor is
a Big4. H1 is supported. Regarding stakeholder pressure, the environment, employees, and investors affect the
level of disclosure, while consumer pressure does not. Finally, we ﬁnd that companies in the Scandinavian
system report with a signiﬁcantly lower level of disclosure than their counterparts in countries in the French
legal system. They also report with lower levels of disclosure than the companies in the English legal system
(90% signiﬁcance).
H2: Companies report on sustainability with higher levels of credibility when the ﬁnancial auditor is a Big4
We also used Sample 1 to test H2. Using the unconditional Model 2, the test of country as a random effect shows
that country explains 26.77% of the total variability of the dependent variable (Credibility). This result justiﬁes that
the data are nested into two levels, although it can be observed that the effect is much less than in the unconditional
model 1.
When we introduced the explanatory and control variables FABig4, LegalSystem, EU, Stakeholder pressure, and
Disclosure, the intraclass correlation coefﬁcient turns into 20.73%, indicating a reduction with respect to the
corresponding parameter in the unconditional Model 2 (26.77%). This reduction indicates the explanatory effect
of all or part of the variables introduced in the model.
Table 4 shows the exponential coefﬁcients of the ﬁxed effects, considering the odds of presenting the SR assured
rather than without assurance. All other things being equal, the odds are:
• 0.500 times lower in companies audited by a non-Big4 than in companies audited by a Big4 (less likely to include
an AS when audited by a non-Big4).
• 0.266 times lower in companies in the German legal system than in companies in the Scandinavian legal system
(less likely to include an AS for companies in Germany than in Scandinavian countries).
• 0.737 times lower in companies with non-consumer pressure than in companies with it.
• 0.169 times lower in companies with the lowest application level than in companies with the highest.
In summary, companies report on sustainability with higher levels of credibility when the ﬁnancial auditor is a
Big4. H2 is supported. FABig4 is signiﬁcant at 99%. Companies in the Scandinavian legal system submit SRs with
higher levels of credibility than their counterparts in Germany. Companies in consumer-oriented industries are

Model term

Coeff.

Std. error

t

Sig.

Intercept
FABig4 (nonBig4)
LegalSystem (English)
LegalSystem (French)
LegalSystem (Germany)
LegalSystem (Scandinavian )
EU (value 0=non-EU)
Environment-press (no-environment-press.)
Employee-press. (no-employee-press.)
Consumer-press. (no-consumer-press.)
Investor-press. (no-investor-press.)
Disclosure (low levels of disclosure)

2.517
-0.693
-0.622
-0.636
-1.326
0.000
-0.602
-0.040
0.041
-0.305
-0.087
-1.708

Exp. (coeff.)

0.422
0.167
0.528
0.454
0.666

5.968
-4.151
-1.179
-1.399
-1.991

0.000***
0.000***
0.238
0.162
0.047**

12.388
0.500
0.537
0.530
0.266

0.311
0.098
0.175
0.096
0.104
0.106

-1.934
-0.403
0.233
-3.175
-0.837
-16.808

0.053*
0.687
0.816
0.002***
0.403
0.000***

0.548
0.961
1.041
0.737
0.916
0.169

Table 4. Fixed coefﬁcients (Model 2)
*signiﬁcant at 90% level.
**signiﬁcant and 95% level.
***signiﬁcant at 99% level
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more likely to present SRs with higher credibility than companies in other industries. Although slightly signiﬁcant
(90% level) companies in the EU present SRs with higher credibility than companies in other countries. Finally,
companies that present the highest levels of disclosure are more likely to include an AS in their SR.
H3: Companies audited by a Big4 are more likely to hire a Big4 for assurance of SR
Using Sample 2, we started by running the unconditional Model 3. The test of country as random effect, by the
intraclass correlation coefﬁcient, shows that country explains 47.64% of the total variability of the dependent variable
(AssurerBig4). This result justiﬁes that the data are nested into two levels.
As a second step, when we introduced explanatory variables as ﬁxed effects, AFBig4, LegalSystem, EU, Industry,
Size, and Disclosure, the intraclass correlation coefﬁcient turns into 43.48%. The reduction with respect to the correlation calculated in the unconditional model refers to the explanatory effect of all or part of the variables introduced in
the model.
Table 5 shows the exponential coefﬁcients of the ﬁxed effects, considering the odds of hiring a Big4 as SR assuror
instead of hiring a non-Big4. All other things being equal, the odds are:
•
•
•
•
•

0.103 times lower in companies audited by a non-Big4 than in companies audited by a Big4.
0.486 times lower in companies in the Construction industry than in companies belonging to Financial services.
0.328 times lower in companies in Commercial services than in companies belonging to Financial services.
0.484 times lower in companies in the Primary sector than in companies belonging to Financial services.
0.309 times lower in companies in the Manufacturing industry than in companies belonging to Financial
services.
• 0.259 times lower in companies in the Consumer goods industry than in companies belonging to Financial
services.
• 0.694 times lower in no listed companies than in listed.
Model term

Coeff.

Std. error

t

Sig.

Intercept
FABig4 (no-Big4)
LegalSystem (English)
LegalSystem (French)
LegalSystem (German)
LegalSystem (Scandinavian)
EU (non-EU)
Industry (Energy)
Industry (Construction)
Industry (Commercial services)
Industry (Transportation)
Industry (Primary sector)
Industry (Manufacturing)
Industry (Technology)
Industry (Consumer goods)
Industry (Other)
Industry (Financial services)
Disclosure (low levels of disclosure)
Listed (not-listed)
Size (small and medium)

2.612
-2.274
-1.181
-0.261
-0.369
0.000
-0.686
-0.436
-0.721
-1.115
0.147
-0.726
-1.174
-0.297
-1.351
-0.545
0.000
-0.225
-0.365
0.299

Exp (coeff.)

0.711
0.322
0.897
0.771
1.142

3.673
-7.070
-1.317
-0.339
-0.323

0.000
0.000***
0.188
0.735
0.747

13.603
0.103
0.307
0.770
0.692

0.535
0.236
0.314
0.256
0.404
0.283
0.314
0.320
0.272
0.284

-1.282
-1.846
-2.295
-4.352
0.364
-2.570
-3.734
-0.928
-4.958
-1.918

0.200
0.065
0.022**
0.000***
0.716
0.010***
0.000***
0.354
0.000***
0.055*

0.503
0.646
0.486
0.328
1.158
0.484
0.309
0.743
0.259
0.580

0.159
0.166
0.317

-1.418
-2.205
0.944

0.157
0.028**
0.345

0.799
0.694
1.348

Table 5. Fixed coefﬁcients (Model 3)
*signiﬁcant at 90% level
**signiﬁcant at 95% level
***signiﬁcant at 99% level.
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Summarizing, the likelihood of hiring a Big4 as an SR assurance provider is higher in companies audited by a
Big4 than in companies audited by a non-Big4. Hence, H3 is supported. Regarding industry membership, our
results show that companies in the Financial services are more likely to hire a Big4 as an SR assuror than
companies in the Construction, Commercial services, Primary sector, Manufacturing, and Consumer goods
industries. We also ﬁnd that the chance of hiring a Big4 as an SR assurance provider is higher in listed companies
than in non-listed ones.

Discussion
We ﬁnd that companies audited by Big4 audit ﬁrms present the highest level of disclosure in their SRs.
According to DeAngelo (1981), Big4 ﬁrms require their clients to increase their levels of voluntary disclosure
in order to increase their visibility. Additionally, large companies are usually audited by Big4 accounting ﬁrms
and have more resources to present the highest level of disclosure in their SRs. Companies in the French
legal system present SRs with a higher level of disclosure than companies in the Scandinavian legal system.
The French legal system includes Spain, which is considered a leader in SR communication (KPMG, 2008,
2011, 2013). We ﬁnd that companies in the EU present the highest level of disclosure of SR. This result
can be explained by the effect of the EU policies toward sustainability that make Europe a leader in sustainability reporting and assurance (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014b; Romero et al., 2014). In accordance with those
of Alali and Romero (2012), Campell (2003), Cho et al. (2014), and Ben (2010), our results conﬁrm that
companies in environmentally sensitive industries present the highest level of disclosure. We also ﬁnd that
employee pressure and shareholder pressure are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with the level of disclosure, consistent with the results of Huang and Kung (2010). This effect can be explained by the size of the
companies: large companies have greater employee pressure and more resources to provide higher levels of
disclosure on sustainability.
According to Zorio et al. (2013) and Sierra-García et al. (2013), companies audited by a Big4 present their SRs with
more credibility than those audited by a non-Big4. This result may indicate a signal the ﬁnancial auditor sends
among their clients in order to expand their business. Our results show that consumer pressure is positively related
to credibility. Probably the companies well known to the general public as a consumer of its products or services are
trying to improve their image by providing more credibility in their reports (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014a). On the
contrary, we do not ﬁnd that employee pressure (measured by size), shareholder pressure (represented by being a
listed company), or environmental pressure (belonging to an industry with high environmental impact) promote
disclosure with higher levels of credibility, after controlling for the auditor being a Big4. It seems that in terms of
credibility of the reports, having a Big4 auditor overcomes all pressures other stakeholders may impose. The likelihood of presenting an assured SR is lower in countries in the German legal system than in the Scandinavian legal
system, which may be linked to the environmental tradition of Scandinavian companies. Slightly signiﬁcant is the
association between the companies in the EU and credibility, which can be explained by the EU policies toward sustainability, as concluded by Romero et al. (2014). We also ﬁnd that companies that present the highest level of disclosure are more likely to present an AS, which signals the commitment toward CSR. In line with Cho et al. (2014),
who conclude on industry membership as a weak indicator related to differences in reporting, we ﬁnd no relationship between industry and SR credibility.
According to Sierra-García et al. (2013), companies audited by Big4 are more likely to hire a Big4 to assure the SR,
which conﬁrms the role played by the ﬁnancial auditors in the sustainability assurance service. This result indicates
evidence of the movement of the assurance market toward accounting ﬁrms. This result is consistent with that of
Suddaby et al. (2007) and KPMG (2013). We also ﬁnd that listed companies and ﬁrms belonging to the Financial
services industry, are more likely to hire a Big4 as an SR assuror than companies in other industries. The need
to offer a reliable image in both ﬁnancial and sustainability reports may explain the choice of Big4s, as they are
considered higher quality providers (Perego, 2009; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2012).
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Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to investigate the role the Big4 auditing companies play in CSR reporting and its
assurance, and the links between the yet-to-develop assurance market and the mature auditing market, in an
international setting. Previous literature states that several determinants at the company level affect the disclosure
and the credibility of the SR and the choice of the assurance provider in Spanish companies. We further extended
this research topic to an international setting. Our results conﬁrm a signiﬁcant association between having the SR
assured by a Big4 when the ﬁnancial auditor is a Big4, for an 18-country sample. To test the ﬁrst two hypotheses,
namely if companies report on sustainability with higher levels of disclosure/more credibility when the ﬁnancial
auditor is a Big4, our sample includes 2751 observations. From this initial sample, we obtained a subsample of
1415 company-year observations to investigate Hypothesis Hypothesis 0, namely if companies audited by a Big4 hire
a Big4 for SR assurance.
To summarize, if a company hires a Big4 as ﬁnancial auditor, it positively affects the level of disclosure and
credibility of the reported sustainability information. The choice of a Big4 as a ﬁnancial auditor is a driver for the
choice of a Big4 as an SR assurance provider, suggesting potential competitive advantage. This paper explores a
new scenario, in which little is known. Country affects the level of disclosure and credibility of the SR. Our results
conﬁrm the important role of the EU in promoting CSR communication. Industry, through environmental,
employee, consumer, and investor pressure (Models 1 and 2), plays an important role on disclosure and credibility.
The relationship between industry and the fact that the assurer is a Big4 can anticipate a possible specialization of
these auditing ﬁrms.
Our results contribute to the literature by revealing the strategies the Big4 follow in the sustainability assurance
market. They have a speciﬁc academic implication in showing the country effect in the study of the sustainability
assurance market, which implies the need to include this variable in future research. The results may also be helpful
to regulators, when establishing requirements for CSR information disclosure and assurance, and for companies
when deciding to assure their SR and selecting an assurer. We show that other things equal, when a Big4 audits
the ﬁnancial statements, the quality and creditability of the SR increases, which may be related to the pressure
imposed by auditors to enhance disclosure. Our results may also be useful for assurance providers by making them
aware of the industries in which companies are more concerned about credibility of the SR. This knowledge might
help them develop their strategies regarding the sustainability assurance market. It looks like the better point of
entry in this market is through ﬁnancial auditing of ﬁrms.
Our paper conﬁrms the connection between the ﬁnancial auditor and an SR assurer in an international setting.
We are aware of possible limitations that could affect our results, like the composition of the sample consisting of
companies presenting their SRs in the GRI, which may bias the results. The countries of our sample, selected to
offer a global overview, might also affect our ﬁndings.
Further research dealing with the interrelationships among agents that participate in the SR assurance market is
needed. It might be also interesting to analyze the connection between ﬁnancial auditor and assurance provider and
what, if it is the case, is the role of each big accounting ﬁrm in this new market.
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